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Abstract
While competition constrains the ability of banks to extract informational rents from lend-
ing relationships, their informational monopoly also curtails competition through the threat of
adverse selection. To analyze an intermediary's optimal strategic response to these opposing
eects we specify a model where the severity of asymmetric information between banks and
borrowers increases with informational distance. Intermediaries acquire expertise in a specic
sector and exert eort in building lending relationship beyond their core business. They then
compete with each other in transaction and relationship loan markets where they dierentiate
their loan oers in terms of informational location. As increased competition endogenously
erodes informational rents intermediaries shift more resources to building relationships in their
core markets. This retrenchment from peripheral loan segments permits banks to fend o the
competitive threat to their captive market. Outside their core segment they oer transactional
loans. In equilibrium, both forms of debt compete with each other but intermediaries specialize
in a core market with relationship banking.
Stimulating discussions with Arnoud Boot, Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Stephen Sharpe and Ernst-Ludwig von Thad-
den are gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimers apply.Relationship Banking, Loan Specialization and Competition
1 Introduction
Two broad trends characterize the recent evolution of commercial banking. While the industry
has consolidated both within and across economies at a rapid pace, competition has also sharply
increased. Indeed, one of the most cited driving forces behind the rapid consolidation in banking are
the competitive pressures exerted by products and services that are close substitutes. Investment
banks, mutual funds, insurance companies, and private investment vehicles have all started to
compete for the core business of commercial banks: making loans and collecting deposits. These
trends beg the question of how increased competition aects the nature of nancial intermediation
and, in particular, the relationship between banks and borrowers. Although the emerging nancial
conglomerates have become more distant from their customers in their pursuit of economies of scale
or scope, intermediaries also have an incentive to seek closer ties with borrowers to fend o the
competition. In this paper we investigate how competition and informational asymmetries interact
to shape nancial intermediation and loan markets.
Financial intermediaries arise from the need to overcome the consequences of informational
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers.1 In their attempt to do so, they specialize in infor-
mation production that allows them to appropriate part or all of the gains from informed interme-
diation.2 Furthermore, such information about borrower quality is often relation-specic so that
certain banks enjoy an information-induced competitive advantage. While competition for borrow-
ers tends to erode informational rents and relationship value, it is hindered by an adverse selection
problem, which is at the root of the monopolistic nature of nancial intermediation. In the sequel,
we seek to clarify how banks respond to increasing competitive pressures in terms of relationship
building, what lending strategies they follow, how they dierentiate markets according to lending
modes,3 and how they allocate investments between core and peripheral markets.
Our analysis starts from the observation that the importance of informational asymmetries
between banks and borrowers depends on the nature of the lending relationship and the bank's
expertise in the collection and processing of information. In our model, banks compete for borrowers
1Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) and Allen (1990) emphasize dierent aspects of monitoring
and screening while Diamond and Dybvig (1983) focus on intermediation as liquidity transformation.
2Rajan (1992), Sharpe (1990) or von Thadden (1994) focus on the informational advantages to the inside bank,
while Boot and Thakor (1999) analyze the benets of the relationship as they accrue to the borrower.
3By lending mode, we mean whether banks choose to lend on a relationship or arm's length basis.in a three stage process. Upon entering a loan market intermediaries invest in relationship building
technology that generates borrower specic information. They then decide whether to build a
lending relationship with borrowers who are located around them. In order to capture the varying
degrees of informational expertise and relationship building present in modern banking we take the
information generation success to be a function of the informational distance between bank and
borrower. The closer a borrower is located to a bank in informational distance the more informative
the relationship becomes and the better a bank can assess a borrower's credit worthiness. Given
the location-dependent screening and relationship building choice, banks oer a particular type of
loan and interest rate to borrowers who then choose the bank with the best quote.
We nd that banks to engage both in transactional and relationship lending. As relationship
rents attract more intermediaries into the industry, increased competition translates into more direct
competition between transactional and relationship lending. In a nancial sector consisting only
of a few intermediaries, a bank faces three distinct loan market segments: a purely transactional
market where it competes with all other banks at arm's length, a captive market in which it builds
lending relationships with informationally captured borrowers and a contested market where it
competes with its nearest neighbors. Entry shrinks the purely transactional segment so that, in the
end, only the local market between a bank and its nearest competitor remain. In this market each
bank informationally captures some of the borrowers and faces transactional competition from its
nearest competitors. To fend o competitive threats to its relationship rents banks shift resources
from peripheral markets to their core segment.
In contrast to traditional models of nancial markets on the circle  a la Salop (1979),4 the
locational dierentiation impacts the bank (supplier) through information decay and not its cus-
tomers (borrowers) through transportation costs. This approach allows us to cast varying degrees
of lending expertise and sector specialization in terms of dierentiated asymmetric information.5
As a consequence, the strength of a relationship depends on the quality of a bank's information
about a borrower's credit worthiness. There is no reason to assume that banks have equal access
to information ex ante, so that information dierentiation captures the degree of specialization in
relationship building stressed, among others, by Boot and Thakor (1999). Our main contribution
is to show how information dispersion within the banking industry shapes the nature of competi-
tion and nancial intermediation. As banks move away from their core markets, competition from
transactional lending and increasing informational asymmetries erode their specialized lending ex-
pertise. Hence, they have an incentive to retrench from peripheral markets and concentrate their
relationship building eort in their principal market segment as competition grows.
Our analysis complements the results of Boot and Thakor (1999), who study the incidence of
4See, for instance, Chiappori, Perez-Castrillo, and Verdier (1995).
5Almazan (1999) analyzes a related model in which a bank's expertise for monitoring a loan is a decreasing function
of the distance between borrower and bank. His focus, however, is on the role of bank capital as a way of providing
incentives to monitor, and not on the generation of rents through information or on the organization of the industry.
2increased competition on a bank's choice between dierent modes of lending and specialization.
However, in our framework we explicitly derive relationship rents from informational asymmetries
and show how the latter's dierentiated nature leads to entry, competition, loan market segmen-
tation, and rent erosion. These results contrast with Dell'Ariccia, Friedman and Marquez (1999)
where adverse selection in lending actually blocks entry. Similar in spirit to our work, Sharpe
(1990) studies borrowing under adverse selection, and shows that if relationship building generates
inside information, competition in the renancing stage will be constrained. Rajan (1992) empha-
sizes the disadvantages of informed (relationship) vs. uninformed (\arm's length") debt, but does
not make clear how the distribution of information aects loan market equilibria and competition.
Broecker (1990) and Riordan (1993) both analyze the eects of competition on loan markets under
independent loan screening, and study market equilibria but do not consider the choice between
dierent lending forms nor the incentives to invest in relationship building.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a formal model of nancial in-
termediation, information acquisition, and relationship building in the context of a locationally
dierentiated market. Section 3 derives the loan market equilibria in the local lending market
between two banks. Next, we characterize relationship building and lending in such local market.
Section 5 analyzes the choice of informational investment, loan specialization and entry in the in-
termediation game's overall equilibrium. Section 5.2 discusses implications of the results. Proofs
are mostly relegated to the Appendix.
2 A Model of Locationally Dierentiated Credit Assessment
Banking relationships take time to build and involve costly eort, especially on the bank's side.
Typically, banks will make a rst loan that serves as a loss leader in order to learn more about
the borrower and better assess the potential for future lending. Over time, a mutual commitment
to the business relationship develops and both parties accumulate private information about the
other. The ensuing information duopoly benets a bank by allowing it to extract information rents
from its borrowers. In building a lending relationship banks incur costs that stem from credit
analysis, renancing (corporate rescues) and write-downs on bad loans. Hence, a convenient way
to capture the informational aspects of relationship banking is to cast the analysis in terms of costly
credit assessment. At the same time, the required up-front investment in intermediation technology
and competitive pressures force banks to specialize in particular loan market segments. To model
a bank's sector specialization we assume that the quality of its private information decays with
informational distance to borrowers.
Specically, let there be a continuum of borrowers uniformly located on a circle with circum-
ference 1. Each potential borrower has an investment project that requires an initial outlay of $1
and generates a terminal cash ow . This cash ow can be an amount R with probability p and
0 with probability 1   p, where  2 fl;hg denotes the rm's type. We assume that the success
3probability for the rm with the better investment opportunity is higher: ph > pl: Final cash ows
are observable and contractible, but borrower type  is unknown to either borrower or lender.6
The likelihood of nding a good rm h is q and this distribution of borrower types is common
knowledge. We also assume that borrowers have no private resources, and that plR < 1 < phR, so
that it is ecient to nance good borrowers but not bad ones. Moreover, letting p  qph+(1 q)pl
denote the average success probability, we assume that pR > 1, so that it is ex ante ecient to
grant a loan.
N banks compete for these borrowers in three stages. First, banks decide whether or not to
enter the loan market and how to invest in a relationship building technology  that generates
borrower-specic information. We assume that if they enter, they will locate equi-distantly around
the circle. Relationship banking requires costly investments along two dimensions. Banks invest
in a core competency I, i.e., by acquiring expertise in a geographic market, nancial product,
or borrower group, and exert an eort  to extend this expertise to other market segments (
can be thought of as the transferability of the bank's expertise). Lending relationships lead to
better credit assessments that provide banks with an informative signal about a borrower's type.
However, credit assessments are not perfect and depend on the distance of the borrower to the
screening bank, denoted by x. In particular, the banking relationship yields a signal  2 fl;hg
whose quality depends on the informational distance x. The following distributional assumptions
capture the idea of locationally dierentiated asymmetric information:7
Px f = hj = hg = (x) = Px f = lj = lg
Px f = hj = lg = 1   (x) = Px f = lj = hg
(1)
where the probability of successful screening (x) decreases with distance, but increases in both
the investment in core competency, I, and in the eort to transfer this expertise to other market
segments, . We also assume that relationship banking is informative so that (x)  1
2.
The preceding specication captures the idea that banks enjoy an informational advantage in the
market segments in which they specialize. The more they move outside their core competencies and
the less eort they exert in extending their core franchise to new markets, the more severe become
the information problems that they face. The investment in this screening or relationship-building
technology is, however, costly. We take credit assessments with success rate (x) to require an





  (ln(1   I) + I);  0;I 2 (0;1): (2)
6Alternatively, we could assume that there are no self-selection or sorting devices such as collateral available
because, e.g., the borrower is wealth-constrained and the project can not serve as collateral.
7All probabilities are a function of informational distance x which we suppress in the interest of notational clarity
in the sequel.
4Second, banks decide whether or not to engage in a relationship building eort with an appli-
cant borrower. The screening technology8  underlying the lending relationship allows banks to
assess the borrower's type at cost c: For concreteness, suppose that for   0 and I 2 (0;1), bank-


















regardless of borrower type : Note that both I, the degree of specialization, and , the inverse of
the decay rate of the credit worthiness signal, are an entering bank's choice variable and that all
probabilities are well dened.
If more than one bank try to establish a lending relationship with the same borrower, we assume
that the banks located farther away can only gather information about the most informed bank's
borrower-specic knowledge. Consider a borrower located closer to bank n who is also approached
by bank n + 1 at the screening and relationship building stage. In this case, bank n + 1, located
further away, only observes a noisy signal on the outcome of bank's n lending relationship with
the borrower. This assumption captures the fact that lending relationships develop over time and
are observable to outsiders. The bank that rst established a business relationship not only has
the most expertise in this market segment (closest in informational distance) but also can use the
relationship to fend o competition by other banks for relationship lending. As a result, it will
know at least as much as the less informed bank, which is precisely our noisy signal assumption.9
Finally, conditional on entry and the screening results (if the bank extracted information), banks
compete in the third stage by simultaneously making interest rate oers. These oers can depend
on the informational location of the borrower (x). Borrowers choose last by obtaining a loan from
the bank quoting the lowest rate. Figure 1 summarizes the time structure of the intermediation
game.
Note that our specication allows us to think of bank lending as either relationship-driven (the
bank has borrower specic information) or transaction-driven (lending without screening). In our
model costly screening serves as a metaphor for the time, eort and resources that it takes to build
a relationship with a customer, and for the losses that a bank might incur during this period. We
could equally well assume that banks rst make a loan to a borrower, and learn some information
about that borrower in the course of granting and maintaining the loan.10 The focus would then
8The need for banks in this framework arises from their ownership of the screening technology that motivates
delegating this tasks to specialized intermediaries.
9Specically, we assume that the information collected by the closer bank is a sucient statistic for any signals
observed by banks further away. We make this assumption purely for tractability, so that we can model competition
for borrowers as a simple auction with one informed bidder and N  1 uninformed bidders, and not concern ourselves
with matters of information aggregation for now. Note that our specication implies that the aggregate amount of
information about a borrower remains constant as a function of the number of screening banks.
10Our specication is completely analogous to standard relationship banking models such as that of Sharpe (1990).
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Figure 1: Banking under locationally dierentiated asymmetric information
be on the competition for borrowers once (some) relationships have already been established. In
this context, screening permits a bank to insure a borrower against random shocks to protability,
so that even borrowers who have had bad outcomes in the past may continue to be nanced if
they are known (by their inside bank) to have positive NPV projects.11 While there may be other
aspects to long-term lending relationships, our focus is consistent with that of much of the recent
literature (e.g. Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), or von Thadden (1998)).
Our specication is quite dierent from the usual treatment of competition with dierentiated
products, e.g., Salop (1979). In particular, such models assume that consumers (borrowers) have
preferences for some suppliers (banks) over others, so would naturally prefer to purchase (borrow)
from one particular source, all things equal.12 Here, we place no such restriction on borrowers'
preferences, and merely use the circle to model banks' expertise in evaluating some borrowers
better than others. In particular, products are not dierentiated per se so that borrowers have to
choose the one that is best for them. Instead, banks dierentiate the loans themselves so that, by
investing in specialization, they add value to a lending relationship and generate information rents.
3 Lending Competition
As a preliminary step, we derive a potential borrower's success probability in light of the bank's
credit assessment. By Bayes' rule, the probability of a project being of high or low quality given a
credit assessment of  = h or  = l is
P f = hj = hg =
(x)q
(x)q + (1   (x))(1   q)
 H(x)
Instead of loan screening, we could let banks initially make uninformed loan oers whose outcomes lead to an informed
one in the second period. The screening cost is now simply the expected cost of bad rst period loans.
11It is in this sense that relationships (screening) are good for both borrowers and banks. To the extent that this
insurance is valuable to a borrower, relationship lending can be of value to a borrower even if it comes at the price
of being somewhat locked in to their lending bank.
12This outcome usually results from imposing a transportation cost which is proportional to the distance between
consumer and supplier. Since the cost of transportation is increasing in the distance between the consumer and the
supplier, consumers have a tendency to purchase from suppliers that are nearer.
6P f = lj = lg =
(x)(1   q)
(x)(1   q) + (1   (x))q
 L(x)
Note that location dependent screening success implies Hx  @
@xH(x) < 0 and Lx  @
@xL(x) < 0:
the posterior distributions on borrower type  deteriorate in informational distance. We obtain
the project's success probability conditional on a pre-existing lending relationship and borrower
location p(;x) as
p(h;x)  P f = Rj = hg = H(x)ph + (1   H(x))pl 2 [p;ph]
p(l;x)  P f = Rj = lg = (1   L(x))ph + L(x)pl 2 [pl;p]
for credit assessment outcomes  = h;l: Note that px(h;x)  @
@xp(h;x) = (ph   pl)Hx < 0, since
Hx < 0: the probability of the project being successful after a positive credit assessment ( = h)
decreases for borrowers located further away. Similarly, px(l;x)  @
@xp(l;x) = (pl  ph)Lx > 0 since
Lx < 0. In other words, the probability of the project being successful after observing a negative
signal from the lending relationship increases with the distance between bank and borrower. As
the signal becomes less informative a bank should be less likely to believe that the borrower is, in
fact, of low quality.
We now characterize the equilibrium in the lending game where informed banks compete for
each others' customers. Solving the game by backward induction, we start with its last stage.
The appropriate equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBE). Conditional on
having entered the industry, each bank competes for borrowers with all competitor banks. However,
the equilibrium can be fully characterized by just assuming that each bank competes only with its
two nearest neighbors on either side, which is a standard feature of this class of models.13 Hence,
it suces to study the competition for borrowers in the last stage for the case of two adjacent
banks, n and n + 1, competing for borrowers located between them. By symmetry, both banks
will be informed about some borrowers and uninformed about others so that we arbitrarily label
one intermediary i for informed and the other one u for uninformed. Note that the informed bank
becomes the relationship bank, and the uninformed bank acts as a transaction lender.
As has been demonstrated in similar contexts (see, e.g., Broecker (1990) or von Thadden (1998)),
the interest rate game between two neighboring banks does not have an equilibrium in pure strate-
gies when one bank has superior information. However, there exists a unique equilibrium in mixed
strategies which we now characterize in terms of banks' distribution functions over interest rate
oers. Let Fi(r;;x) represent the bidding distribution by an informed bank for borrowers located
at a distance x, conditional on the loan screening outcome . Similarly, let Fu(r;y) represent
the bidding distribution of an uninformed bank for borrowers located at a distance y. Also, we
dene 
i(;x) as the equilibrium expected prot for an informed bank, and 
u(y) as that for an
13For further details see, e.g., Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983).
7uninformed bank.
Proposition 1 (Unique Lending Equilibrium) The bidding game for a particular borrower lo-
cated a distance x from bank i and y = 1=N x from bank u has a unique, mixed-strategy equilibrium,
characterized by continuous and strictly increasing distribution functions Fi(r;;x), Fu(r;y), such
that:
1. the uninformed bank engaging in transactional lending breaks even (
u(y) = 0);
2. relationship banking allows the informed bank to earn positive expected prots 
i(h;x) > 0 on
borrowers with  = h, while it breaks even on borrowers with  = l, i.e., 
i(l;x) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The lending game has an outcome very reminiscent of Bertrand competition. Since, by de-
nition, the uninformed transactional lender has no private information about the borrower, it is
unable to obtain any rents from the loans it grants. The informed bank, however, is able to use its
informational advantage over competitors to extract relationship rents on high quality borrowers
(or those with a high signal). A relationship bank's ability to distinguish good from bad risks allows
it to adjust its bidding and lending strategy accordingly, and subjects less informed transactional
lenders to problems of adverse selection.
From the result above, we obtain an explicit characterization of the location dependent dis-
tribution functions over interest rates. For this purpose, dene ~ x as the distance x such that
p(l;x)R = 1.14 It is also useful to dene rp as the break-even rate on an average borrower, i.e.
rp = 1=p.
Corollary 1 (Loan Rate Distributions) The informed and uninformed bank make randomized















For values of x such that x < ~ x, the informed bank denies credit to all  = l borrowers, while the






p(h;x)R 1 . For values of x such that
14Since it is inecient to lend to low quality projects it might appear that a bank should never lend to a borrower
who failed the credit worthiness test ( = l). However, since the success probability conditional on a negative credit
assessment is increasing in informational distance, i.e.,
@
@xp(l;x) > 0; there exists a location ~ x such that p(l;x)R < 1
for x < ~ x and p(l;x)R > 1 for x > ~ x. In other words, for borrowers suciently far away, observing a negative
credit quality signal through the lending relationship is not much more informative than not carrying out a credit
assessment. Hence, a bank should still be willing to continue the business relationship and lend to such borrowers.
8x > ~ x, the informed bank oers credit to all  = l borrowers by oering a rate of rl(x) = 1
p(l;x),
while the uninformed bank bids with probability 1 but places a positive mass on the upper bound of
the support, r = rl(x).
Proof. See the Appendix.
To provide some intuition for the location dependence of loan granting policies consider the
simple case of two banks, i.e., N = 2, specialization parameter I = 1, and information decaying






exactly the midpoint between two banks located at opposite extremes of the circle of circumference
1. For values of x near zero, the probability that the uninformed bank bids at all is quite low, and
the informed bank obtains high prots on these borrowers. As x increases, the probability of bidding
by the uninformed bank increases, since the adverse selection problem it faces is decreased. In the
limit, as x approaches 1=4, the distribution functions for both the informed and the uninformed
bank should concentrate all mass at r = rp = 1=p: limx!1
4 Fu(r;x) = limx! 1
4 Fi(r;h;x) = 1 for all
r  rp. In essence, at x = 1
4, neither lender has any information and so compete in a symmetric
way, driving all prots to zero, which is the Bertrand outcome.
Before analyzing the issues of relationship building and entry, it is useful to derive some com-
parative statics results on the market equilibrium. We rst dene a measure of the importance of
relationship building and credit assessments, p  ph pl, which represents the degree of borrower
heterogeneity.
Corollary 2 (Prot Characterization) For the equilibrium of the intermediation game's lend-
ing stage,
1. the prots to the informed bank on borrowers with signal  = h are decreasing in the bank-
borrower distance x: @
@x
i(h;x) < 0;




Proof. See the Appendix.
The rst part of the proposition says that an informed bank makes lower prots on those
borrowers that are farther away (in information space). The intuition for this is simply that as
we move further away from a bank, the quality of information the bank has about that borrower
decreases, so that its rents from information should decrease as well. The second result concerns the
importance of screening by focusing on the degree of borrower heterogeneity. As borrowers become
more heterogeneous, an informed bank earns higher prots on those borrowers with good signals,
9even if the average success probability remains constant.15 Behind this part of the proposition lies
the adverse selection problem faced by the uninformed bank, as screening becomes more important
the more dierent are the borrowers.
4 Local Market Equilibrium
Having characterized the competition for borrowers between an informed and an uninformed bank,
we now turn to the banks' decision to build a relationship with borrowers. Since, by symmetry,
every bank competes both in relationship and transactional lending, we denote a given intermediary
by n  N: We rst verify that, in equilibrium, borrowers are not screened by multiple banks. It
then follows that banks build banking relationships with borrowers on either side of their location
up to a point ^ x where expected prots from lending to that borrower equal the screening cost c (as
long as this does not lead to multiple screening):
E [
n (; ^ x)] =  (^ x)
n (h; ^ x) + (1    (^ x))
n (l; ^ x) = c
where  (x) = P f = hg is the probability of nding a borrower with a signal of high quality.
Proposition 2 (Screening Range) Banks screen borrowers up to maximal informational dis-
tance ^ xn where for A  1
ppq(1   q)












Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition justies our analysis in the previous section of one informed bank competing
against a number of uninformed banks. If more than one bank had screened a borrower, competition
among these banks would drive prots to zero for all but the most informed bank. Only the bank
closest in informational space could possibly recoup its screening cost c, so that it would never
pay to screen a borrower that is located closer to a competitor bank. The restriction that ^ x be
no greater than 1
2N is then a direct consequence of the preceding: in any symmetric equilibrium
with ^ xn > 1
2N there would be an interval of borrowers that are screened by both banks, so that
the bank located further away would always fail to recoup its cost of screening c. Note that a
bank screens more borrowers (^ x is greater) the larger its expertise in its core market (I); the more
transferable its skill () and the lower the marginal screening cost c. Also, screening becomes
15One might suspect that this result is driven by the fact that a change in p constitutes a change in ph, so that
borrowers with a high signal should also be considered to be qualitatively better borrowers. However, a similar result
is obtained by keeping ph xed and lowering only pl, so that it is clear that it is exactly the severity of the information
problem that drives the result.
10more important as borrowers are more dissimilar. As p increases and borrower characteristics
become less homogeneous, banks screen further out since creditworthiness assessments become
more important. This critical informational location ^ x then determines the size of each bank's
relationship lending market.
It emerges that banks split up our informational circle into a number of captive segments
where at most one bank engages in relationship lending. In particular, symmetric equilibrium with
^ xn < 1
2N would imply that between any two banks there is a set of borrowers that are not screened
by either bank. For these borrowers we would expect to observe a form of symmetric loan price
(interest rate) competition among all banks. For all other borrowers - those less than a distance
of ^ x from some bank - competition among potential lenders will always be characterized as in the
previous section, with one informed relationship bank and one, uninformed, transactional lender.
Proposition 3 (Relationship Prots) Ex-ante expected prots to a bank engaging in relation-
ship building (gross of the screening cost c) are:
1. decreasing in x: @
@xE [
n(;x)] < 0
2. increasing in p: @
@pE [
n(;x)] > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proposition asserts that, before the signal is observed, expected prots are decreasing in
the distance of the borrower to the bank (market specic lending expertise), but increasing in our
measure of the information problem. We should therefore expect that the incentive to acquire
information is lower for borrowers that are far away, but should increase as borrowers become more
heterogeneous.
Proposition 4 (Loan Specialization) The local banking market between two banks n and n+1
is characterized by:
1. @Fi
@x > 0: an informed bank's bid is (stochastically) decreasing in the distance from bank to
borrower;
2. @Fu
@y < 0: conditional on bidding, an uninformed bank's bid is (stochastically) increasing in
the distance from bank to borrower.
Proof. See the Appendix.
These results imply that the expected interest rate oered in both relationship and transactional
lending is a decreasing function of x (where y = N 1 x), the distance between informed bank and
borrower. Relationship banks tend to be well informed about borrowers located nearby and less
11informed about borrowers far away. Hence, the adverse selection problem in transactional lending
is greater for an uninformed bank the closer a borrower is located to a competitor bank. As the
distance between the borrower and the informed bank increases, the informed bank's information
advantage decreases, bringing both competitors closer to a situation of symmetric Bertrand com-
petition. With diminishing adverse selection the uninformed bank is able to bid more aggressively.
In the limit, as the informed bank's information advantage goes to zero, the expected interest rate
for both banks collapses to the zero-information break-even rate, rp.
Corollary 3 (Competitive Intensity) The probability of an uninformed bid decreases in dis-
tance from bank to borrower as
@
@y < 0:
Proof. Since  (y) = Fu (R;y) by Corollary 1 the preceding proposition establishes the result.
Once again, adverse selection is the driving force behind this result. The closer one gets to
the market in which the informed bank specializes through relationship building, the more severe
the adverse selection problem faced by the uninformed bank becomes. Hence, the latter needs
to be careful in its transactional loan oers and will refrain more frequently from bidding for
customers with established lending relationships. In fact, one can interpret the uninformed bank's
bidding probability as an indicator of the local market's competitiveness, which increases in the
informational distance between borrower and relationship bank. The closer borrowers are to the
informed bank, the less likely they are to receive a transactional loan oer. Hence, even with
increased competition banks still have an incentive to invest in relationship lending to avoid loosing
high quality customers to arm's length debt, a topic we turn to next.
5 Entry and Loan Specialization
After characterizing lending and relationship building we now turn to a bank's decision to enter
the loan market, its investment in screening technology and its strategic focus. Recall that the
success in extracting information from lending relationships depends on banks' investments in core
competencies I and their willingness to conquer a captive market as reected in ex ante eort .
The precise mix of specialized expertise and transferability of skill determines a bank's strategy
in the relationship lending market and its response to increased competition. First, we analyze
the investment and intermediation strategy decision for a given number of active banks. We then
investigate the free entry case where banks optimally allocate a xed investment budget between
specialized expertise and relationship building eort.
To determine the equilibrium investment Kn and its optimal allocation between specialized
expertise I and eort in relationship building , we calculate the total prots for bank n upon
entering. Total gross prots for bank n, summed across all screened borrowers can be expressed
12for A  1
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Z ^ xn
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[A(2(x)   1)   c]dx:
Given the number of active banks N, an entering intermediary n will choose   0 and I 2 (0;1)













  [log(1   I) + I]

(4)
Since we are only interested in the case of increasing competition, we will assume that N is su-
ciently large so that ^ x  1
2N is binding, i.e., ^ x = 1
2N. This will allow us to look at how changes in
N aect a bank's relationship building strategy.
Proposition 5 (Investment and Competition) For a xed value of N, the prot maximizing












Proof. See the Appendix.
Once banks screen up to (2N)
 1, the entire market is \covered" by at least one bank, so that
increasing the number of banks would merely shrink the share of the market screened by each bank.
However, note that for this latter case a clear relationship is established between the number of
banks and the choice of relationship building eort: as N increases, banks choose a lower value
of . The same is true for I : as more banks are active it becomes harder to sustain investments
in specialized lending expertise. Put dierently, as competition increases banks invest less in the
screening technology, since K will also be lower.
One interpretation of this outcome is that, while banks may very well continue to screen all
borrowers and, therefore, establish relationships with them, the resulting relationship lending re-
sembles more and more transaction or arm's-length debt. The increased competition that banks
face, while forcing them to try to maintain a hold over the largest set of borrowers possible, also
decreases their incentive to invest in information acquisition. Perhaps as importantly, it follows
that the aggregate amount of information in the economy decreases as the number of active inter-
mediaries N increases, leading to more inecient lending decisions.16 However, as the importance
16Broecker (1990) illustrates a similar result using a model of independent but symmetric creditworthiness tests,
and shows that as the number of banks increases, the number of bad borrowers obtaining loans increases as well. In
13of the information asymmetry problem increases (p and A), banks choose a higher values of  and
I; consequently investing more in the screening technology. In other words, as the risk of lending
to a poor quality borrower increases, banks invest more in the screening technology, which helps
them avoid making inecient lending decisions.
5.1 Free Entry Equilibrium
In order to consider the free entry equilibrium, we rst x the relationship lending technology
expenditure K =  K. An important part of the analysis is to investigate banks' investment strate-
gies in response to entry into the relationship lending market. As more and more banks become
active each bank's captive relationship lending market shrinks while its transactional market seg-
ment grows. The question arises how banks optimally re-allocate resources between investments in
specialized expertise I and transferable skills (eort)  as competitive pressures grow.
Proposition 6 (Investment Allocation) For xed technology expenditure  K, banks increase in-
vestment in specialized expertise (@I
@N > 0) and cut back on non-segment specic eort (@
@N < 0)
as the number of banks increases.
Proof. See the Appendix.
A bank's upfront investment determines its scope in terms of its relationship banking market
segment. The more it allocates to general relationship building eort  the more breadth it ac-
quires in terms of lending activities. At the same time, the bank starts to venture out of its core
markets and nds itself in increasing competition with banks in neighboring market segments with
potentially superior expertise in those markets. As more intermediaries crowd the markets, banks
are less able to appropriate the informational gains from lending relationships with borrowers out-
side their core expertise. Hence, they cut back on their overall scope, reducing their investment in
general transferable skills or eort : The resources freed up in this retrenchment are now invested
in their core competencies, so that segment specic expertise expenditure I increases. In other
words, as a result of growing competition banks become more specialized in their core markets at
the expense of breadth. While each bank's captive market shrinks with entry the remaining lending
relationships become more valuable to the bank. The natural outcome is then for each bank to
further specialize in its core relationships in order to extract higher informational rents from these
borrowers.17
his model, this occurs because, with N independent but noisy tests, the probability that any given borrower passes
at least one test increases with the number of banks. Shaer (1997) provides some evidence that is consistent with
models of this kind: as the number of banks in a market increases, each bank's provision for loan losses increases.
However, Broecker's model diers from ours in a crucial way. In Broecker, the aggregate amount of information
increases as the number of banks increases, even if the inference problem for each bank gets worse. In our model it
is not an increased winner's curse that leads to our result, but rather a reduced incentive to screen.
17Note that despite the increase rent extraction, this need not necessarily be bad for borrowers. As explained
previously, this view of relationship lending adds an element of insurance for the borrower, and so has some value to
14Given a xed lending technology expenditure  K we can now determine how the free entry
number of banks depends on characteristics of the market.
Proposition 7 (Optimal Entry) For xed technology expenditure  K, the free entry number of
banks, N, is increasing in the degree of borrower heterogeneity, p, and decreasing in the cost of
monitoring, c.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The free entry equilibrium number of banks is a function of both the choice of the information
acquisition technology (I;) as well as the cost of screening, c, and the characteristics of the borrow-
ers, p. As should be expected, N is lower for higher values of c: the cost of screening borrowers
lowers each bank's protability directly, and so should lead to a lower number of banks in equilib-
rium. The eect of borrower heterogeneity p is more subtle because it also aects the investments
in specic and non-specic expertise (I;). However, as was demonstrated earlier, greater borrower
heterogeneity has a positive eect on bank prots for a xed screening technology. Therefore, the
market can support a greater number of banks when borrowers are more heterogeneous.
5.2 Discussion
Our analysis shows how informational asymmetries concerning borrower quality lead to relationship
rents, whose magnitude depends crucially on the information advantage of a lender relative to its
competitors. By establishing a direct link between the degree of informational asymmetries among
banks and their protability, we are able to investigate how changes in the industry structure
aect a bank's incentive to invest in its core market and informationally capture borrowers. While
relationship lending confers an informational advantage on intermediaries, the ensuing informational
rents attract competition from two dierent sources. Not only do entering banks compete for each
others' established customer base, but relationship banking also nds itself under increased pressure
from arm's length debt. This dual competitive threat constrains the ability of banks to extract
informational rents from lending relationships. However, their informational monopoly also makes
competition less eective through adverse selection hazards to competitors.
A bank's optimal strategic response to increasing competition consists in shifting more resources
to its relationship lending segment in order to protect the rents obtained in that sector. Neverthe-
less, each bank's captive market segment shrinks so that a smaller number of borrowers becomes
more captured. In equilibrium, banks oer two types of debt products. In their core market, they
engage in relationship loans that are specialized in terms of borrower specic information; in all
other markets they oer arm's length debt. Although we cast the analysis in terms of transactional
the borrower. Greater investment in the relationship should also lead to better insurance, even if this comes at an
increased cost.
15loans, they could actually comprise a much wider set of debt instruments including public debt.
The key characteristic of this kind of lending is that it lacks a previous investment in information
acquisition and relationship building eort.
In our model, bank protability stems from the relationship lending market where banks are able
to generate private information and extract informational rents from borrowers. For other forms
of lending, competition drives rents down to zero so that banks just break even. Although banks
may very well obtain rents from borrowers with which they have established a working relationship,
other types of lending are little protected from competition. In particular, banks trying to poach
a competitor's customers will suer from a large adverse selection problem. Consequently, they
are unable to attract a suciently large number of high quality borrowers so as to make positive
prots.
Our results shed some light on the recent debate concerning the nature and future evolution of
banking. Boot and Thakor (1999) have made the point that the changing competitive nature of
the banking market can and should have an impact on banks' lending strategies. They argue that
increased competition, either among banks, types of debt or from outside sources, will drive banks
to invest more in relationship lending as this is the primary source of bank prots and banks are
uniquely equipped to add value to borrowing rms. Our analysis highlights the role of asymmetric
information and relationship rent seeking as the underlying economic forces in this process. Lending
relationships are valuable to borrowers because of their implicit insurance against adverse outcomes.
They are clearly also valuable for banks: borrower-specic information translates into relationship
rents. Hence, banks are willing to protect these rents in the face of increased competition by
specializing in a core expertise, dierentiating loans in terms of the obtained information and
sacricing peripheral markets.
Growing competition has two direct eects on bank protability. First, banks try to increase
the percentage of loans they grant as relationship loans, even as each bank's overall market share
shrinks. Second, while banks extract information more successfully from lending relationship, they
make less eort to extend their franchise beyond their core markets. As the number of banks
increases, banks retrench to their core competency by relying on relationship lending, but their
relationships add less value to peripheral borrowers who provide lower rents to the bank.
This result stems from an issue that we believe is often overlooked in the literature. To the
extent that most of a bank's prots come from activities where they hold a measure of market
power, we would expect them to be most aected by changes in competition. Given that private
information is an important determinant of bank prots, markets in which banks have no private
information, e.g., transactional loan markets, should closely resemble the pure price competition
ideal even with a very limited number of competitors. In these markets, increasing the number
of competitors is expect to have little impact.18 By contrast, we show that increased competition
18This is, once again, simply the standard Bertrand result that price competition can drive rents to zero even with
just two competitors. Increasing the number of competitors has no impact on the equilibrium prots.
16does have a signicant impact on markets characterized by bank-borrower relationships. Banks'
incentives change with the number of competitors, so that the incentive to build a relationship
becomes stronger for a smaller market segment. Hence, one should not expect relationship lending
to resemble more arm's length debt as competitive pressures grow.
6 Conclusion
The rapidly changing competitive landscape of nancial intermediation raises questions about the
industry's emerging new structure. One particular uncertainty concerns the degree to which banks
will specialize in dierent market segments and whether they will be more or less likely to build
stable business ties with their borrowers. Banking relationships revolve around a mutual commit-
ment to engage in long-term lending. At the same time, they generate relation-specic information
that permits intermediaries to informationally capture borrowers. In this analysis, we explore the
consequences of increased competition between banks on banks' incentives to build lending rela-
tionships. We cast relationship lending in terms of costly credit worthiness assessments and loan
related loss leaders. Intermediaries invest in core expertise and exert costly eort in transferring it
to adjacent market segments. To fully take into account the importance of asymmetric information
in lending decisions we incorporate an explicit model of loan specialization into our analysis in
which a bank's expertise decreases for borrowers outside its core market.
As banks enter into the loan market they crowd out the purely transactional sector where all
intermediaries compete on an arm's length basis. Each bank specializes in a particular market seg-
ment where it attempts to build lending relationships so as to obtain rents. At the same time, all
banks continue to compete in arm's length debt outside their captive (relationship) market. Con-
sequently, they oer both relationship and transactional loans, albeit in dierent market segments.
Furthermore, relationship banking allows banks to dierentiate their loans in terms of borrower at-
tributes. As the quality of information extracted from lending relationships varies across borrowers,
banks specialize through relationship investments to gain a competitive advantage. Informational
asymmetries now exert two countervailing eects on the market equilibrium. Relationship rents
attract entry, which increases competition and forces banks to concentrate their resources in a
shrinking relationship lending segment. At the same time, relationship banking poses an adverse
selection problem for less informed competitors. In equilibrium, banks retreat from peripheral
markets in order to protect their core segment.
The benet of a lending relationship stems from the informational advantage that it confers
on a bank in fending o competition from transactional debt while its costs revolve around the
informational investments it has to make. Since maintaining relationships with heterogeneous bor-
rowers is dicult and costly, banks face retrenching decisions that lead to sector specialization with
rising competitive pressures. Forming the same relationship with borrowers that are farther away
from its eld of expertise is more costly, so that banks keep their investment in those relationships
17at a minimum. Within its relationship lending market, a bank fully discriminates between its bor-
rowers in terms of loan rates. As the quality of the information changes with borrowers that are
increasingly outside its area of expertise, a bank faces increased competition from the transactional
market that tempers its rent seeking and holds down loan rates. Contrary to traditional models of
product dierentiation, it is the bank that absorbs the cost of dierentiation through investment in
specialization in order to add value to the lending relationship for both parties. Hence, relationship
banking can survive increased competition through specialization and loan dierentiation.
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20Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Unique Lending Equilibrium
The proof proceeds in a sequence of steps: rst, we establish that there does not exist a pure
equilibrium in relationship lending. Next, we show that the two competing banks oer loan rates
over the same interval, then we verify that the mixed strategies are well-behaved distribution
functions and, nally, we prove uniqueness by explicitly calculating the location dependent mixed
strategies. Let rp = p 1 and rl (x) = p(l;x) 1:
Lemma 1 (Absence of Pure Strategy Equilibria) There exist no pure strategy equilibria in
the bidding game for borrowers between a relationship and transactional lender.
Proof. Let pure strategies conditional on signal and borrower location be denoted by ri() and
ru for the informed and uninformed bank, respectively (we ignore the dependence on x for now).
Suppose that ru  ri(h);ri(l). In order for this to be optimal for the uninformed bank, ru  p 1.
However, the informed bank could increase its prot by oering a rate ri(h) = ru    and lending
to all  = h borrowers. Therefore, ru  ri(h);ri(l) cannot be an equilibrium.
Suppose then that ri(h)  ru  ri(l). In this case, the uninformed bank only makes loans
to  = l borrowers. In order for this to be optimal for the uninformed bank, it must be that
ru  p(l;x) 1. If ri(h) < ru, the informed bank would be better o charging ri(h) + . But if
ri(h) = ru, the uninformed bank would be better o charging a rate ri(h)    and lending to all
borrowers. Therefore, ri(h)  ru  ri(l) cannot be an equilibrium.
Finally, suppose that ri(l)  ru  ri(h). At ru, the uninformed bank lends only to  = h
borrowers and makes positive expected prots if ri(l) makes non-negative prots for the informed
bank. But then, as above, if ru < ri(l), the informed bank could increase its prots strictly by
lowering its bid to ru    and lending to all good borrowers. Therefore, this also cannot be an
equilibrium, and no equilibrium exists in pure strategies.
Lemma 2 (Common Support) Both banks randomize their loan oers over the same interval
[rp;rl (x)^R). Moreover, the informed bank earns positive expected prots and the uninformed one
breaks even.
Proof. Let Fi(r;;x) represent the bidding distribution for the informed bank for a borrower
located at distance x, and Fu(r;N 1   x) the bidding distribution for the uninformed bank, con-




i) and r 2 [ru;ru); respectively. The expected prots for
both banks from oering a rate r are for F (r ) := lims"r F (r)
i (r;;x) :=
 
1   Fu(r ;N 1   x)










[p(h;x)r   1] (6)





We rst consider a borrower located at x < ~ x from the informed bank so that p(l;x)R < 1:




so that the informed bank makes positive prots
on high-quality borrowers and does not oer loans to low-quality ones.
21Obviously, the informed bank never bids on a  = l borrower for so that Fi(r;l;x) = 0 for
all x < ~ x and all r 2 [rl
i;rl
i). The uninformed bank will never bid less than rp = p 1 because
low quality rms switch banks at any oer so that the loan pool has a success probability of at
most p: But then, the informed bank will never oer rates below rp to its high quality customers
( = h) making positive prots on high-quality borrowers: i (r;h;x) > 0: Clearly, both informed
and uninformed banks will never oer (gross) rates higher than R; the project's pay-o in the
successful state.
Claim 2 Fi (r;h;x) is continuous on [rh
i ;rh
i ):
Suppose not, i.e., there exists s 2 [rh
i ;rh
i ) such that Fi (s ;h;x) < Fi (s;h;x): Since the informed
bank makes positive (expected) prots on high-quality borrowers p(h;x)r 1 > 0 on [rh
i ;rh














is also right-continuous there exists a neighborhood [s;s + "];" > 0;
say, on which Fu must be constant implying Fu(s;N 1   x) = Fu(s ;N 1   x). Hence, by (5)
i (r;h;x) is continuous at s and strictly increasing on the neighborhood; but then, Fi (r;h;x) can
not have any mass on [s;s + "] so that Fi (s ;h;x) = Fi (s;h;x): )(










= P f = hg(1   Fi(r;h;x))[p(h;x)r   1] + P f = lg[p(l;x)r   1] (7)
which is continuous on [ru;ru) by continuity of Fi (r;h;x): To show that the uninformed bank earns
0 expected prots by bidding Fu suppose the contrary; but Fi (r 




u ;N 1   x

= 0 by continuity: )(
Claim 4 The lower and upper bounds of the common support are given by ru = p 1 = ri and
rh
i = ru = R, respectively.
At ru, the uninformed bank wins almost surely, and so makes a prot of rup   1 = 0, where
p = qpH + (1   q)pL is just the average success probability, implying ru = p 1. But then, the
informed bank will never bid below p 1 so that ru = p 1 = ri. Also, if ru < ri then i (r;h;x) = 0
on (ru;ri] which contradicts i (r;h;x) > 0 so that ri  ru  R; since the uninformed bank never
underbids the informed one on high-quality borrowers rh
i = ru = R: Hence, [rh
i ;rh
i ) = [ru;ru) = 
p 1;R

which does not depend on x:
We now turn to the case of borrowers located at x > ~ x from the informed bank.
Claim 5 If x > ~ x the informed bank bids ri (l;x) = rl (x) = p(l;x)
 1 almost surely for  = l:
Consider [rl
i;rl
i); the support of Fi(r;l;x) for x > ~ x: Clearly ri(l;x)  rl (x) = 1
p(l;x); otherwise
the informed bank would lose money. To show that ri(l;x)  rl (x) suppose the contrary, i.e.,
that ri(l;x) > rl (x). By bidding ru = ri(l;x)   " for small " > 0, the uninformed bank would
make strictly positive prots: while the worst expected type of borrower now is p(l;x), it wins
with a positive probability. Hence, it must be that ru(x) < ri(l;x). However, the informed bank
could similarly realize positive prots by bidding ri = ru(x)    for small  > 0, contradicting the
assumption that ri(l;x) > rl (x) is in the support of Fi(r;l;x).19 )(
19Note that this is analogous to a standard Bertrand undercutting argument.
22The remainder of the proof closely follows the case for x < ~ x with minor modication to give
[rh
i ;rh




so that the upper bound depends on the borrower's location. From






= [ru;ru) = [rp;rl (x) ^ R):
Lemma 3 (Loan Rate Distribution Functions) For all x;y 2

0;N 1
; Fi (r;h;x) and Fu (r;y)
are strictly increasing, continuous distribution functions so that prots i and u are constant on
[rp;rl (x) ^ R):
Proof. By construction, Fi (r;h;x) and Fu (r;x) satisfy the usual requirements of distribution
functions on their common support: By the proof of Lemma 2 Fi (r;h;x) is continuous in both
cases. A similar argument establishes continuity of Fu (r;x): suppose that there exists s 2 [ru;ru)
such that Fu (s ;x) < Fu (s;x): Since Fu is right-continuous i (s ;h;x) > i (s;h;x) as the
informed bank's expected prots for high-quality borrowers is strictly positive. Hence, there exists
a neighborhood [s;s + "];" > 0; say, on which Fi (r;h;x) must be constant. Since Fi (r;h;x)
is continuous so is u (r;x) at s and strictly increasing on the neighborhood by (7); but then,
Fu (r;x) can not have any mass on (s;s + "): )(
To show strict monotonicity, suppose that Fi (r;h;x) is constant on some interval [s;s] 
[rp;rl (x) ^ R) which we can choose without loss of generality so that Fi (s ;h;x) < Fi (r;h;x) =
 F < Fi (s ;h;x) for r 2 [s;s): By continuity, u is strictly increasing on the interval so that Fu
must be constant over [s;s) by the zero prot condition. But now, i (r;h;x) is strictly increasing
on the interval so that Fi (r;h;x) can not have a mass point at s. )(
Monotonicity of Fu is established by a completely analogous argument.
Lemma 4 (Uniqueness) The mixed strategy equilibrium is unique; in particular the informed
















Proof. Since the mixing distributions are strictly increasing by the preceding Lemma expected
prots must be constant on [rp;rl (x) ^ R): For i (r;h;x) =   and u (r;x) = 0 (5) and (7) yield
the following system of equations dening the loan rate distributions:
 
1   Fu(r;N 1   x)

fp(h;x)r   1g =  
P f = hg(1   Fi(r;h;x))[p(h;x)r   1] + P f = lg[p(l;x)r   1] = 0
Evaluating the rst equation at the lower bound of the support shows by Fu(rp;N 1  x) = 0 that
the constant is   = p(h;x)rp 1: Similarly, one can derive a second expression for  (x) = P f = hg
by evaluating the second equation at rp = p 1 to nd  =
p p(l;x)
p(h;x) p(l;x) with slight abuse of notation.















23The preceding distributions represent the unique equilibrium of the competitive bidding game
for a given borrower. As both banks randomize over the full support of the distribution functions
they can not protably deviate from their mixed strategies which establishes uniqueness.
Taken together the preceding three Lemmata prove the Proposition as well as the rst part of
Corollary 1.
Proof of Corollary 1: Loan Rate Distributions
The mixing distributions are derived in Lemma 4. To prove the second part of the corollary, we
need to consider the usual cases x < ~ x and x > ~ x: In the former, the informed bank randomizes
over [p 1;R) for high-quality borrowers without any atoms but with point mass at R : Fi(r;h;x)




p(h;x)R 1 < 1 by p(h;x) > p > p(l;x) so
that










< 1 one nds that the uninformed bank abstains from




because fr  Rg has full measure.




= P fr 6= ;g = 1 
p(h;x)p 1 1










For borrowers located at x > ~ x the common support becomes [rp;rl (x) ^ R) = [rp;r(l;x))
for r(l;x) = p(l;x)
 1 ; the break-even loan rate for low-quality borrowers, since 1 < p(l;x)R: It
is easily veried that Fi(r(l;x)
  ;h;x) = 1 in this case so that the informed bank randomizes












p(h;x)r(l;x) 1 at r(l;x) as Fu(r(l;x)
  ;x) < 1: Finally, note that as x ! ~ x
Fi(r;h;x) !
p(h; ~ x)   p(l; ~ x)
p   p(l; ~ x)
pr   1
p(h; ~ x)r   1
Fi(R ;h; ~ x) = 1 ) i(R;h; ~ x) = 0:
Proof of Corollary 2: Prot Characterization
By the proof of Proposition 1, we know that the equilibrium prots for both banks are the same
for every interest rate oered in the support of the mixing distributions. In particular, at r = p 1
the informed bank wins with probability 1, but only bids if  = h, realizing a prot of 
i(h;x) =
i (r;h;x) = p 1p(h;x)   1 > 0. Dierentiating this expression with respect to distance x shows
that prots to the informed bank decrease in informational distance:
@
@x
i (r;h;x) = rpx (h;x) = r(ph   pl)Hx < 0;
since Hx < 0.
To show that prots to the informed bank conditional on  = h are increasing in p, note
that the prot expression above can be written as 
















as long as H(x) > q (which it is). Therefore, prots to the informed bank are increasing in p, as
desired.
Proof of Proposition 2: Screening Range
We rst show that for c > 0, borrowers are screened by at most one bank. Suppose there are two
banks, n and m, and that they both screen a borrower located at a distance x from bank n and y
from bank m. By assumption, if x < y, bank n's signal is a sucient statistic for bank m's. By an
argument similar to that used in Proposition 1, prots in the subsequent competition stage would
be zero for bank m. This occurs because, even though it is informed, its information is a subset of
bank n's information set, and so the usual zero-prot result holds (see Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al
(1983) for a discussion of this point). If c > 0, bank m would not then recoup its cost of screening,
and so, anticipating that bank n will screen, will not itself screen. Note that this also implies that
a bank will never screen a borrower that is closer to another bank.
Ex ante expected prots are given for  (x) = P f = hg = H(x)q + (1   L(x))(1   q) by




(ph   pl)q(1   q)[h(x)   (1   l(x))]
by n (r;l;x) = 0. If h (x) = l(x) = (x), we nd that E[n (;x)] = 1
p(ph pl)q (1   q)[2(x)   1],
which is well dened: by the informativeness restriction on screening, h (x);l(x)  1
2: E[n (;x)] 
0. E[n (;x)] = c now denes ^ x from 1















for A  1




2N. Otherwise, we would have an overlap in
the screening interval (since banks are symmetric ex-ante), which would contradict the rst result
above. Therefore, it must be that














Proof of Proposition 3: Relationship Prots
These results are easily obtained by noting that, as above, expected ex-ante prots (before a signal





(ph   pl)q(1   q)[h(x)   (1   l(x))]
















l(x) < 0. That expected prots are increasing in p = (ph pl) is clear once we recall
that h(x);l(x)  1
2 for all x.
Proof of Proposition 4: Loan Specialization
Simple dierentiation with respect to x and algebraic manipulations yield for the informed bank's
loan rate distribution function Fi for Di = [p   p(l;x)][p(h;x)r   1]
@
@x
Fi (r;h;x) = D 2
i px (h;x)[p   p(l;x)][p(l;x)r   1][pr   1]
+ D 2
i px (l;x)[p(h;x)   p][p(h;x)r   1][pr   1] > 0
since px (h;x);[p(l;x)r   1] < 0 and px (l;x);[p(h;x)   p];[p   p(l;x)];[pr   1] > 0: Proceeding
similarly for Fu observing that y = N 1   x we nd that
@
@y





[pr   1] < 0









Proof of Proposition 5: Investment and Competition
The result is easily obtained by dierentiating equation (4) with respect to  and I appealing to
the Envelope Theorem and Leibniz' rule. This gives us the following rst order conditions
@Vn
@














yielding for ^ x = 1
2N the desired expressions.
Proof of Proposition 6: Investment Allocation
Let L   K so that  K = C () + C (I) = 2
























































Ln = 0 =
2
2
  [log(1   I) + I]    K












and substitute into the constraint for  or I: Denoting optimal investment levels by (;I) we
dene G(I;N) := C ((I)) + C (I)    K so that G(I;N) = 0. We can now use the Implicit














3   [log(1   I) + I]    K
so that @G
















3 (1   I)
 2 + (1   I)
 1   1 > 0
by I 2 (0;1) implying
d
dN

















































27Proof of Proposition 7: Optimal Entry
Given the choice of  and I, total prots can be expressed as:











The free entry value of N is obtained by setting this equation equal to zero and solving for N.
Note that, for any given ;I, there is always a value of N, N, such that ^ x = 1
2N for all N  N.
Therefore, as long as an equilibrium with positive prots exists for the N = 2 case, we can solve for
the free entry value of N. Keeping in mind that the investment levels  and I are also functions
of N, the following equation implicitly denes N, the free entry number of banks (for ^ x = 1
2N):




To obtain the comparative statics results in the proposition, it suces to focus on the rst term in
Vn, n. It is straightforward to show that, for xed I and , n is increasing in p (see Proposition
3). Allowing I and  to vary to their optimal values for a change in p can only weakly increase
prots relative to the case where they remain xed. Similarly, for ^ x = 1=2N, it is clear that n is
decreasing in N. Therefore, N must increase in order to satisfy the zero prot constrain when p
increases.
A similar and more direct argument applies to changes in c. Increasing the cost of screening,
c, reduces each bank's prots, n. This then implies that N must decrease in order to satisfy the
zero prot constrain when c increases. This establishes our results.
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